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Approved For Release 2004/02/12 : CIA-RDP78B05703A000700060011-1

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10 June 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Near Real Time Satellite Reconnaissance

1. Attached is a copy of the primary report by the [ ] Task Force which has been considering the implications of a Near Real Time Satellite Reconnaissance System on the imagery exploitation and intelligence production process.

2. [ ] had briefed the DCI on his findings on 4 June. The DCI requested early steps to have USIB briefed. In order to avoid hitting [ ] cold with such a briefing and his first USIB meeting, it was decided that [ ] should brief [ ] separately and this was done on 6 June. [ ] indicated some concern lest too much speed be generated in moving this task forward. This is no doubt related to the fact that [ ] findings are based upon an assessment that the solid state array technique as proposed by the Agency is the most feasible technical means to accomplish the purpose.

3. At the same time, [ ] asked that [ ] disseminate copies of his preliminary report to key offices within the Agency and seek quick reaction advice from these offices prior to the USIB meeting. All of this still remains very much a CIA only matter and NPIC was asked to take steps to make sure it is handled this way for the time being.

4. I read the report myself and asked [ ] to do likewise. As a result of this quick assessment, I phoned [ ] this afternoon to pass along the following:

a. The report has been prepared with great clarity and in general has our approval and blessing.

b. The statement made on page 3 about the orderly way in which [ ] can be handled is not nearly so well put as it is in Section V-2.


c. The point made about current facilities on page 4 should include even stronger language about the need for new construction in this regard. To be blunt, [ ] probably would not do.

Declass Review by  
NIMA/DOD

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d. We are a bit puzzled as to why the numbers of [ ] targets as reflected in the chart at the end of the first section should triple at the end of Fiscal 71. This should be re-studied.

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e. The statement in IV-28 about Near Real Time providing the "only possibility" for detecting preparations for intercontinental attack seem to us too strongly stated, likely to cause a fight, and not worth such fighting.

f. The points made in V-9 about the number of frame copies as being "completely overwhelming and unmanageable" are overstated. We can provide the necessary control assuming there is willingness to pay the costs of such controls.

5. I also told [ ] that we thought an early step should be the establishment of a design team under a program manager--the design team to be made up of collectors and exploiters--to make sure the two work hand in hand together. [ ] said he agreed with this and that it would be part of the "Management Supplement" referred to in the memo from [ ] covering the [ ] report. The "Management Supplement" will set forth a number of inter agency and intra agency matters which will be in need of redefinition in the days ahead. This includes relationships between CIA and DOD and between those two agencies and NRO and within the DDI, for example. The Supplement will not spell out proposed solutions but will merely note that these problems will have to be faced.

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[ ]  
Executive Director, NPIC

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